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ABSTRACT
Market making is a fundamental trading problem in which an
agent provides liquidity by continually offering to buy and sell a
security. The problem is challenging due to inventory risk, the risk
of accumulating an unfavourable position and ultimately losing
money. In this paper, we develop a high-fidelity simulation of limit
order book markets, and use it to design a market making agent
using temporal-difference reinforcement learning. We use a linear
combination of tile codings as a value function approximator, and
design a custom reward function that controls inventory risk. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by showing that our
agent outperforms both simple benchmark strategies and a recent
online learning approach from the literature.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The role of a market maker is to provide liquidity by facilitating
transactions with other market participants. Like many trading
problems, it has become increasingly automated since the advent
of the electronic limit order book (LOB), as the need to handle
more data and act on ever shorter time scales renders the task al-
most impossible for humans [25, 29]. Upwards of 60% of trading
volume on some particularly active markets has been attributed
to automated trading systems [27, 36]. This paper uses reinforce-
ment learning (RL) to design competitive market making agents
for financial markets using high-frequency historical equities data.
1.1 Related work.
Market making has been studied across a number of disciplines, in-
cluding economics, finance, artificial intelligence (AI), and machine
learning. A classic approach in the finance literature is to treat mar-
ket making as a problem of stochastic optimal control. Here, a model
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for order arrivals and executions is developed and then control algo-
rithms for the resulting dynamics are designed [3, 10, 11, 20, 23, 28].
Recent results in this line of research have studied price impact, ad-
verse selection and predictability [1], and augmented the problem
characteristics with risk measures and inventory constraints [7, 22].
Another prominent approach to studying market making and
limit order book markets has been that of zero-intelligence (ZI)
agents. The study of ZI agents has spanned economics, finance and
AI. These agents do not “observe, remember, or learn”, but can, for
example, adhere to inventory constraints [18]. Newer, more intelli-
gent variants, now even incorporate learning mechanisms [14, 43].
Here, agents are typically evaluated in simulated markets without
using real market data.
A significant body of literature, in particular in AI, has studied
the market making problem for prediction markets [6, 34, 35]. In this
setting, the agent’s main goal is to elicit information from informed
participants in the market. While later studies have addressed prof-
itability, the problem setup remains quite distinct from the financial
one considered here.
Reinforcement learning has been applied for other financial trad-
ing problems [32, 37, 39], including optimal execution [33] and
foreign exchange trading [16]. The first case of applying RL to
market making [12] focused on the impact of noise (due to unin-
formed traders) on the agent’s quoting behaviour and showed that
RL successfully converges on the expected strategies for a number
of controlled environments. They did not, however, capture the
challenges associated with explicitly handling order placement and
cancellation, nor the complexities of using continuous state vari-
ables. Moreover, [12] found that temporal-difference RL struggled
in their setting, a finding echoed in [39]. [12] attributed this to
partial observability and excessive noise in the problem domain,
despite the relative simplicity of their market simulation. In fol-
low up work, [38] used importance sampling as a solution to the
problems observed with off-policy learning. In contrast, we find
temporal-difference RL to be effective for the market making prob-
lem, provided that we use eligibility traces and carefully design our
function approximator and reward function.
One of the most recent related works is [2], which uses an online
learning approach to develop a market making agent. They prove
nice theoretical results for a stylizedmodel, and empirically evaluate
their agents under strong assumptions on executions. For example,
they assume that the market has sufficient liquidity to execute
market orders entirely at the posted price with no slippage. We use
this approach as one of the benchmarks for our empirical evaluation
and address the impact of trading in a more realistic environment.
1.2 Our contributions.
Themain contribution of this paper is to design and analyse temporal-
difference (TD) reinforcement learning agents for market making.
In contrast to past work [12, 38] we develop a high-fidelity simu-
lation using high-frequency historical data. We identify eligibility
traces as a solution to the unresolved issues previously associated
with reward attribution, noise and partial observability [12]. We
then design a reward function and state representation and demon-
strate that these are key factors in the success of our final agent.
We outline the steps taken to develop our agent below:
(1) We build a realistic, data-driven simulation of a limit or-
der book using a basket of 10 equities across 5 venues and a
mixture of sectors. This data includes 5 levels of order book
depth and transaction updates with time increments on the
order of milliseconds.
(2) We address concerns raised in past work about the efficacy
of one-step temporal-difference learning, corroborating their
results but demonstrating that eligibility traces are a simple
and effective solution.
(3) We investigate the performance of a wide range of new and old
TD-based learning algorithms.
(4) We show that the “natural” choice of reward function (incre-
mental profit and loss) does not lead to the best performance
and regularly induces instability during learning. We propose
a solution in the form of an asymmetrically dampened re-
ward function which improves learning stability, and produces
higher and more consistent returns.
(5) We provide an evaluation of three different state space con-
structions and propose a linear combination of tile codings
as our final representation as it gives competitive performance
with more stable learning.
(6) We present a consolidated agent, based on a combination of
the best results from 1–5 above, and show that it produces the
best risk-adjusted out-of-sample performance compared to a
set of simple benchmarks, a basic RL agent, and a recent online
learning approach [2]. Moreover, we show that the performance
of our consolidated agent is competitive enough to represent a
potentially viable approach for use in practice.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Limit order books.
A limit order (LO) is an offer to buy or sell a given amount of an
asset at a fixed price (or better). Each limit order specifies a direction
(buy/sell or, equivalently, bid/ask), a price and a volume (how much
to be traded). A limit order book is an aggregation of LOs that have
been submitted to the market. The book has a fixed number of price
levels, and the gap between the price levels is called the tick size.
An example limit order book is shown in Fig. 1.
There are two types of orders: Market Orders (MOs) and Limit
Orders. A market order is a request to buy or sell now at the current
market price. When it arrives at the exchange it is executed against
limit orders starting with the best price. That is, a sell market order
will execute against the highest priced bid limit orders, and a buy
Price Asks
101.00 12
100.50 13
100.25
35 100.00
3 99.75
11 99.50
Bids
Figure 1: Snapshot of a limit order book with multiple price
levels occupied by bid or ask orders and a total volume.
market order will execute against the lowest priced ask limit orders.
This process may spill-over to further price levels if there is not
enough volume at the first level of the book.
In contrast, a limit order is an offer to buy or sell at prices no
worse than a limit price. When a limit order arrives at the market,
it joins the back of the execution queue at its quoted price level,
meaning that market orders will match against limit orders at a
given price on a first-come first-served basis. If a limit order is
submitted at a price level that currently holds limit orders with
opposite direction (for example, a bid limit order submitted to a
price level with ask limit orders quoted), then they are immediately
executed against each other. This means that a given price level
can only have one direction quoted at any given time.
The market spread is the difference between the best bid and
ask quotes in the LOB. The mid-price,m, is the mid-point of the
spread, defined simply by the arithmetic mean of the best bid and
ask. When the best bid or ask changes, the mid-price move, denoted
by ∆m, is the change in the mid-price since the last time period. For
example, in Fig. 1, the best bid and ask prices are 100.00 and 100.50,
respectively, the mid-price is 100.25 and the market spread is 0.5.
For a full examination of LOBs, their mechanics and nomenclature,
see Gould et al. [2013] or Abergel et al. [2016].
2.2 Market making.
Market makers (MMs) are “traders who profit from facilitating
exchange in a particular asset and exploit their skills in executing
trades” [9]. They continually quote prices at which they are willing
to trade on both sides of the book and, in so doing, provide liquidity
to the market. If both orders execute, then they gain their quoted
spread, which will be at least as big as the market spread, but may
be more if they did not quote at the best price on either side.
Example. Consider a trader acting in the order book shown in
Fig. 1, with ask and bid orders at 101.00 and 99.50, respectively,
each for q = 100 units of volume. In this case, the quoted spread
is ∆ = 1.50 and if both orders execute then the trader will make
q∆ = 100 × 1.50 = 150 profit.
By quoting on both sides of the book, there is a risk that only
one of the orders will execute, and thus the market maker may
pick up a non-zero inventory. This may be positive or negative, and
represents the extent to which the market maker has bought more
than it has sold, or vice versa. A simple idealised market maker
seeks to make money by repeatedly making its quoted spread, while
keeping its inventory low to minimise market exposure. A more
advanced market maker may choose to hold a non-zero inventory
to exploit clear trends, whilst simultaneously capturing the spread.
3 THE SIMULATOR
We have developed a simulator of a financial market via direct
reconstruction of the limit order book from historical data. This
data comprised 10 securities from 4 different sectors, each with
8 months (January — August 2010) of data about the order-book
depth, which records how much volume was at each level of the
LOB, and the actual transactions that took place. The simulator
tracks the top 5 price levels in the limit order book, and allows an
agent to place its own orders within these price levels.
This approach to simulating an exchange is highly realistic and
makes limited assumptions about the market. It should be noted
that, since the market is reconstructed from historical data, simu-
lated orders placed by an agent cannot impact the market. However,
for all of the agents studied in this paper, the size of the orders used
by the agent are small compared to the total amount traded in the
market, so the impact of the agent’s orders would be negligible.
One problem does arise, however, due the fact that we only have
aggregate information about the limit orders. When we see that the
amount of volume at a particular price level has decreased, we know
that either some of the orders at that level have either been executed
or they have been cancelled. Since we have transaction data, we
can deal with the case where limit orders have been executed, but
when limit orders are cancelled, we do not know precisely which
orders have been removed.
This causes a problem when an agent’s order is currently being
simulated for that price level, because we do not know whether
the cancelled order was ahead or behind the simulated order in the
queue. Our solution is to assume that cancellations are distributed
uniformly throughout the queue. This means that the probability
that the cancelled order is ahead of the agent’s order is proportional
to the amount of volume ahead of the agent’s order compared to
the amount of volume behind it.
4 THE AGENT
4.1 Trading strategy.
In this paper we consider a state-based market making agent that
acts on events as they occur in the LOB, subject to constraints such
as upper and lower limits on inventory. An event may occur due to
anything from a change in price, volume or arrangement of orders
in the book; anything that constitutes an observable change in the
state of the environment. Importantly, this means that the agent’s
actions are not spaced regularly in time. Since we are building a
market maker, the agent is required to quote prices at which it is
willing to buy and sell at all valid time points, unless the inven-
tory constraints are no longer satisfied at which point trading is
restricted to orders that bring the agent closer to a neutral position.
The action-space (Table 1) is based on a typical market making
strategy in which the agent is restricted to a single buy and sell
order and cannot exit the market, much like that considered by
Table 1: A typical action-space for market making.
Action ID 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ask (θa) 1 2 3 4 5 1 3 2 5
Bid (θb) 1 2 3 4 5 3 1 5 2
Action 9 MO with Sizem = − Inv(ti )
Chakraborty and Kearns [2011]. There are ten available actions, the
first nine (IDs 0–8) of which correspond to a pair of orders with
a particular spread and bias in their prices. Smaller values of θa,b
lead to quotes that are closer to the top of the book, while larger
numbers cause the quotes to be deeper in the book. This means
that the agent may choose to quote wide or tight, or even to skew its
orders in favour of the buy/sell side. The final action (ID 9) allows
the agent to clear its inventory using a market order.
Formally, actions 0 through 8 cause limit orders to be placed at
fixed distances relative to a reference price, Ref (ti ), chosen here
to be a measure of the true market price: the mid-price. At each
time step, ti , the agent revises two control parameters, θa (ti ) and
θb (ti ), from which the relative prices, Dista,b (ti ), are derived; the
allowed values are given in Table 1. The full specification of the
agent’s pricing strategy is thus given by Eqs. 1 and 2 below,
pa,b (ti ) = Ref (ti ) + Dista,b (ti ), (1)
Dista,b (ti ) = θa,b (ti ) · Spread(ti ), (2)
where Spread(ti ) is a time-dependent scale factor which must be
a multiple of the market’s tick size. In the experiments to follow,
Spread(ti ) is calculated by taking a moving average of the market
half-spread: s (ti )/2.
All limit orders are placed with fixed, non-zero integer volumes,
Sizea,b. The market order used in action 9 is sized proportionately
to the agent’s current inventory, Sizem (ti ) = −α · Inv(ti ), where
α ∈ (0,1] is a scaling factor and Inv(ti ) is the agent’s inventory at
time ti . We ensure that Sizem is restricted to be a non-zero integer
multiple of the minimum lot size in the market. Note that volume
is defined to be negative for buy orders and positive for sell orders,
as in the nomenclature of Gould et al. [2013].
4.2 Reward functions.
The “natural” reward function for trading agents is profit and loss
(PnL): i.e. how much money is made or lost through exchanges with
the market. Under this reward function, the agent is encouraged
to execute trades and hold an inventory which will appreciate in
value over time; this is captured in Eq. 3.
Formally, for a given time ti , let Matcheda (ti ) and Matchedb (ti )
be the amount of volume matched (executed) against the agent’s
orders since the last time ti−1 in the ask and bid books, respectively,
and letm(ti ) denote the mid-price at time ti . We define
ψa (ti ) ≜Matcheda (ti ) · [pa (ti ) −m(ti )] ,
ψb (ti ) ≜Matchedb (ti ) · [m(ti ) − pb (ti )] ,
where pa,b (ti ) are given by Eq. 1. These functions compute the
money lost or gained through executions of the agent’s orders
relative to the mid-price. Observe that if both orders are executed
in the same time interval [ti−1,ti ], then ψa (ti ) +ψb (ti ) simplifies
to the agent’s quoted spread. Then, if Inv(ti ) denotes the agent’s
inventory at time ti , we can define the incremental (non-dampened)
PnL function Ψ(ti ) by setting Ψ(t0) ≜ 0 and
Ψ(ti ) ≜ψa (ti ) +ψb (ti ) + Inv(ti )∆m(ti ). (3)
The third (inventory) term here corresponds to the change in the
agent’s cash holdings due to exposure to changes in price in the
market. Note that this term is only necessary because we accounted
for the PnL from the agent’s trades relative to the mid-price.
While the definition given above is a natural choice for the
problem domain, it will be shown in this paper that such a basic
formulation of the reward function ignores the specific objectives
of a market maker, often leading to instability during learning
and unsatisfactory out-of-sample performance. We thus study two
alternative, dampened definitions of reward which are engineered
to disincentivise trend-following and bolster spread capture. The
three reward functions that we study are as follows:
PnL:
ri = Ψ(ti ). (4)
Symmetrically dampened PnL:
ri = Ψ(ti ) − η · Inv(ti )∆m(ti ). (5)
Asymmetrically dampened PnL:
ri = Ψ(ti ) −max[0, η · Inv(ti )∆m(ti )]. (6)
For the final two reward functions, the dampening is applied to the
inventory term, using a scale factor η. Intuitively, this reduces the
reward that the agent can gain from speculation. Specifically, the
symmetric version dampens both profits and losses from specula-
tion, while asymmetric dampening reduces the profit from specula-
tive positions but keeps losses intact. In both cases, the amount of
reward that can be gained from capturing the spread increases rela-
tive to the amount of reward that can be gained through speculation,
thus encouraging market making behaviour.
4.3 State representation.
The state of the environment is constructed from a set of attributes
that describe the condition of the agent andmarket, called the agent-
state and market-state, respectively. The agent-state is described
by three variables, the first is inventory, Inv(ti ) — the amount of
stock currently owned or owed by the agent; equivalently, one may
think of the agent’s inventory as a measure of exposure, since a large
absolute position opens the agent to losses if the market moves.
Next are the active quoting distances, normalised by the current
spread scale factor, Spread(ti ); these are the effective values of the
control parameters, θa,b, after stepping forward in the simulation.
The greatest source of state complexity comes from the market.
Unlike the agent’s internal features, the market state is subject to
partial observability and may not have a Markovion representa-
tion. As such, the choice of variables, which may be drawn from
the extensive literature on market microstructure, must balance
expressivity with informational value to avoid Bellman’s curse of
dimensionality. In this paper, we include the following:
(1) Market (bid-ask) spread (s),
(2) Mid-price move (∆m),
(3) Book/queue imbalance,
(4) Signed volume,
(5) Volatility,
(6) Relative strength index.
Three different representations of state, based on these param-
eters, are considered. The first two, named the agent-state and
full-state, are represented using a conventional tile coding approxi-
mation scheme. The third takes a more involved approach, whereby
the agent-state, market-state and full-state are all approximated
simultaneously using independent tile codings, and the value is a
(fixed) linear combination of the values in these three tile codings.
We refer to this as a linear combination of tile codings (LCTC).
Linear combination of tile codings. Assume there are N indepen-
dent tile codings. Let vˆi (x ) be the value estimate of the state, x ,
given by the i-th tile coding. The value of a state is then defined by
the following sum:
vˆ (x ) =
N−1∑
i=0
λivˆi (x ) =
N−1∑
i=0
λi
ni−1∑
j=0
bi j (x )wi j , (7)
where ni is the number of tiles in the i-th tile coding, wi j is the
j-th value of the associated weight vector and bi j is the binary
activation of the j-th tile (taking a value 0 or 1). We enforce that the
λi weights (or influences) sum to unity for simplicity:
∑N−1
i=0 λi = 1.
This approach amounts to learning three independent value
functions, each of which is updated using the same TD-error for
gradient descent. Related approaches involve usingmultiple tile cod-
ings with varying granularity, but using the same set of state vari-
ables, and specific applications to dimension mapping for dynamics
modelling [17, 21]. It has been argued that a coarse representation
improves learning efficiency of a high resolution representation by
directly the agent towards more optimal regions of policy space.
The justification here is the same, the crucial difference is that
we exploit the (approximate) independency of variables governing
the agent-state and market-state rather than the shape of features;
though these techniques could be combined.
This technique is particularly relevant for problems where a lot
of domain-specific knowledge is available a priori. For example,
consider a trading agent holding an inventory of, say, 100 units of a
given stock. Though the expected future value of the holdings are
surely conditional on the state of the market, the most important
factor for the agent to consider is the risk associated with being
exposed to unpredictable changes in price. Learning the value for
the agent-, market- and full-state representations independently
enables the agent to learn this much faster since it does not rely on
observing every permutation of the full-state to evaluate the value
of it’s inventory. It is plausible that this will also help the agent
converge (as in the granularity version mentioned previously) by
guiding the agent away from local optima in policy space.
4.4 Learning algorithms.
We consider Q-learning (QL), SARSA and R-learning [41]. Sev-
eral variants on these are also evaluated, including: Double Q-
learning [26], Expected SARSA [24], On-policy R-learning and
Double R-learning. Though other work has taken the approach
of developing a specialist algorithm for the domain [33], these gen-
eral purpose algorithms have been shown to be effective across
Table 2: Default parameters as used by the learning algo-
rithm and the underlying trading strategy.
Value
Training episodes 1000 days
Training sample size ∼ 120 days
Testing sample size 40 days
Memory size 107
Number of tilings (M) 32
Weights for linear combination of tile codings
(0.6,0.1,0.3)
[agent, market, full] (λi )
Learning rate (α ) 0.001
Step-size [R-learning] (β) 0.005
Discount factor (γ ) 0.97
Trace parameter (λ) 0.96
Exploration rate (ε) 0.7
εFloor 0.0001
εT 1000
Order size (ω) 1000
Min inventory (min Inv) -10000
Max inventory (max Inv) 10000
a wide array of problems. Further, by including discounted and
undiscounted learning methods we may identify characteristics of
the problem domain that will guide our approach.
It should be assumed throughout this paper that each algorithm
was implemented using eligibility traces (ETs), unless otherwise
stated. As such, the conventional suffix, as used by Q(λ) versus
Q-learning, shall be omitted in favour of uniformity1.
5 RESULTS
We begin by introducing a set of benchmarks: a group of fixed
“spread-based” strategies, and an online learning approach based on
the work of Abernethy and Kale [2013] to anchor the performance
of our agents in the literature. Next, a pair of basic agents, using
an agent-state representation, non-dampened PnL reward function
and QL or SARSA, will be presented. These basic agents repre-
sent the best attainable results using “standard techniques” and are
closely related to those introduced by Chan and Shelton [2001]. We
then move on to an assessment of our proposed extensions, each
of which is evaluated and compared to the basic implementation.
This gives an idea of how each of our modifications perform sepa-
rately. Finally, we present a consolidated agent combining the most
effective methods and show that this approach produces the best
out-of-sample performance relative to the benchmarks, the basic
agent, and in absolute terms.
Experimental setup. In each experiment, the dataset was split
into disjoint training and testing sets, where all of the testing data
occurs chronologically later than the training data; separate val-
idation sets were used for hyperparameter optimisation and for
drawing comparisons between the various agents considered in
this paper. Unless otherwise stated, it should be assumed that each
1The code is provided open source at https://github.com/tspooner/rl_markets.
of these experiments were conducted using the parameters quoted
in Table. 2 which were chosen through a combination of good
practices and the use of a genetic algorithm (GA). The GA was
specifically applied to find effective combinations of state variables,
their lookback parameters and the weights used with the LCTC.
Performance criteria. The primary metric used to assess the per-
formance of a trading strategy is the amount of money that it makes.
While it is common to do this in terms of returns (final excess capital
divided by starting capital), this does not make sense for a market
maker since there is no natural notion of starting capital. We also
cannot rate our strategies based on profit since each agent is tested
across a variety of stocks, each of which have varying prices and
liquidity. Instead, we introduce a normalised daily PnL that rates
how good our strategies are at capturing the spread. This metric is
defined on a daily basis as the total profit divided by the average
market spread which normalises the profit across different markets;
this amounts to the number of market spreads that would need to
be captured to obtain that profit.
Ideally, market makers should not keep large inventories. To
measure how well our agents achieve this, the mean absolute posi-
tion (MAP) held by the agent is quoted as well. For example, high
values for this metric may indicate that the agent has taken a spec-
ulative approach to trading. On the other hand, small values could
suggest that the agent relies less on future changes in market value
to derive it’s earnings.
Uncertainties are quoted using the standard deviation and mean
absolute deviation for normalised PnL and MAP, respectively.
5.1 Benchmarks.
To compare with existing work, we include a spread-based bench-
mark strategy which uses an online learning meta-algorithm; the
original version, introduced by Abernethy and Kale [2013], was
adapted to work in our simulator. We consider the MMMW variant
which makes use of the multiplicative weights algorithm to pick
in each period from a class of simple strategies parametrised by a
minimum quoted spread2. The results, which are shown in Table 6,
present less favourable performance than the original paper which
found the strategy to be profitable over all dates and stocks consid-
ered. This could be attributed to the use of a less realistic market
simulation that did not, for example, track the limit order book to
the same level of precision considered here. This may indicate that
their results do not generalise to more realistic markets.
A set of benchmarks were then developed using simple and ran-
dom policies over the market making action space in Table 1. These
strategies quote at fixed, symmetric distances from the chosen ref-
erence price (θa = θb) at all times. Unlike the previous benchmark
strategy, this approach accounts for liquidity in the market by adapt-
ing it’s prices to changes in the bid-ask spread. Further, in all of
these strategies, market orders are used to forcibly clear the agent’s
inventory if the upper or lower bound is reached.
A sample of the results is given in Table 3 for HSBA.L; agent
performance was found to be consistent across the full dataset.
Fixed strategies with θa,b > 1 were found to be just profitable on
average, with decreasing MAP as θa,b increases. In all cases we find
2Consistent with the original work, MMMW was found to outperform the follow-the-
leader variant; see the extended version for a full performance summary [40].
Table 3: Out-of-sample normalised daily PnL (ND-PnL)
and mean absolute position (MAP) for fixed and random
benchmark strategies with inventory clearing, evaluated on
HSBA.L.
ND-PnL [104] MAP [units]
Fixed (θa,b = 1) −20.95 ± 17.52 3646 ± 2195
Fixed (θa,b = 2) 2.97 ± 13.12 3373 ± 2181
Fixed (θa,b = 3) 0.42 ± 9.62 2674 ± 1862
Fixed (θa,b = 4) 1.85 ± 10.80 2580 ± 1820
Fixed (θa,b = 5) 2.80 ± 10.30 2678 ± 1981
Random (Table 1) −10.82 ± 5.63 135 ± 234
Table 4: Mean and standard deviation on the normalised
daily PnL (given in units of 104) for Q-learning and SARSA
using non-dampened PnL reward function and agent-state.
QL SARSA
CRDI.MI 8.14 ± 21.75 4.25 ± 42.76
GASI.MI −4.06 ± 48.36 9.05 ± 37.81
GSK.L 4.00 ± 89.44 13.45 ± 29.91
HSBA.L −12.65 ± 124.26 −12.45 ± 155.31
ING.AS −67.40 ± 261.91 −11.01 ± 343.28
LGEN.L 5.13 ± 36.38 2.53 ± 37.24
LSE.L 4.40 ± 16.39 5.94 ± 18.55
NOK1V.HE −7.65 ± 34.70 −10.08 ± 52.10
SAN.MC −4.98 ± 144.47 39.59 ± 255.68
VOD.L 15.70 ± 43.55 6.65 ± 37.26
that the strategy suffers from high volatility. This may have been
caused by a lack of proper inventory management, as indicated by
the consistently high mean average positions.
5.2 Basic agent.
The basic agent is used to bound the expected performance with-
out the extensions proposed in this paper. This agent used a state
representation comprising only of the agent-state — inventory and
normalised bid/ask quoting distances — and the non-dampened
PnL reward function (Eq. 4). This agent was trained using one-
step Q-learning and SARSA and, consistent with the findings of
past work [12], were unable to obtain useful results in either case.
The addition of eligibility traces (known as Q(λ) and SARSA(λ))
improved the agents’ performance, yielding strategies that occa-
sionally generated profits out-of-sample as seen in Table 4. These
results, however, were still unsatisfactory.
5.3 Extensions.
In this section, three extensions to the basic agent are discussed:
variations on the learning algorithm, reward function and state rep-
resentation. The results are given in Table 5. Each row of the table
consists of the basic agent, again only agent variables included in
the state space, with the one modifier. SARSA with eligibility traces
is used as base the learning algorithm, unless stated otherwise.
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Figure 2: Distributions of daily out-of-sample PnL andmean
inventory for increasing values of the damping factor, η,
evaluated on HSBA.L.
Learning algorithms. The first variation on the basic agent deals
with the impact of using different learning algorithms to QL and
SARSA; the findings are summarised in Table 5. It was found that
variants based on off-policy learning tended to perform worse
than their on-policy counterparts. Note, for example, the differ-
ence between the consistency and outright performance between
R-learning and on-policy R-learning. This may be attributed to
known divergence issues with classical off-policy methods.
Though variants were found to outperform the basic agent for
some specific equity, none were as consistent as SARSA. In the
majority of cases they performed worse, both in out-of-sample per-
formance and learning efficiency. For example, Double Q-learning,
despite mitigating the maximisation bias [26] versus regular Q-
learning, was found to be less profitable and more volatile on most
assets; save for CRDI.MI, a highly active and volatile stock which
may benefit from the double-estimator approach. This again sug-
gests that, while each stock could be optimised individually for
maximal performance, SARSA may be used reliably as a baseline.
Reward functions. The results in Table 5 show that the intuitive
choice of reward function (non-dampened PnL) does not equate to
the best out-of-sample performance across the basket of securities.
Though symmetric dampening was found to exacerbate the flaws in
the basic agent, asymmetric dampening of the trend-following term
in Eq. 3, with sufficiently high damping factor (η), was found to
produce superior risk-adjusted performance in most cases. This is
exemplified by Fig. 2 which shows the distribution of out-of-sample
(actual) PnL for increasing values of the damping factor.
Fig. 2 suggests that there is a value of η ∼ 0.1 about which the
agent begins to converge on fundamentally different policies than
those promoted by the non-dampened PnL function (Eq. 3). This
shift in the final policy is manifested in the change from holding
large, biased inventories towards small and neutral positions. This
reduction in exposure, beginning from η ∼ 0.05, comes along with a
change in PnL, which also tends towards lower variance as a result.
Though the precise value of η varies across the basket of securities,
the impact of asymmetric dampening is clear, providing strong evi-
dence that the inventory term in Eq. 3 is the leading driver of agent
Table 5: Mean and standard deviation on the normalised daily PnL (given in units of 104) for various extensions to the basic
agent, each evaluated over the basket of stocks.
CRDI.MI GASI.MI GSK.L HSBA.L ING.AS LGEN.L LSE.L NOK1V.HE SAN.MC VOD.L
Double Q-learning −5.04 ± 83.90 5.46 ± 59.03 6.22 ± 59.17 5.59 ± 159.38 58.75 ± 394.15 2.26 ± 66.53 16.49 ± 43.10 −2.68 ± 19.35 5.65 ± 259.06 7.50 ± 42.50
Expected SARSA 0.09 ± 0.58 3.79 ± 35.64 −9.96 ± 102.85 25.20 ± 209.33 6.07 ± 432.89 2.92 ± 37.01 6.79 ± 27.46 −3.26 ± 25.60 32.28 ± 272.88 15.18 ± 84.86
R-learning 5.48 ± 25.73 −3.57 ± 54.79 12.45 ± 33.95 −22.97 ± 211.88 −244.20 ± 306.05 −3.59 ± 137.44 8.31 ± 23.50 −0.51 ± 3.22 8.31 ± 273.47 32.94 ± 109.84
Double R-learning 19.79 ± 85.46 −1.17 ± 29.49 21.07 ± 112.17 −14.80 ± 108.74 5.33 ± 209.34 −1.40 ± 55.59 6.06 ± 25.19 2.70 ± 15.40 32.21 ± 238.29 25.28 ± 92.46
On-policy R-learning 0.00 ± 0.00 4.59 ± 17.27 14.18 ± 32.30 9.56 ± 30.40 18.91 ± 84.43 −1.14 ± 40.68 5.46 ± 12.54 0.18 ± 5.52 25.14 ± 143.25 16.30 ± 32.69
Symm. Damp. (η = 0.6) 12.41 ± 143.46 9.07 ± 68.39 30.04 ± 135.89 −11.80 ± 214.15 90.05 ± 446.09 5.54 ± 119.86 8.62 ± 27.23 −4.40 ± 84.93 27.38 ± 155.93 8.87 ± 93.14
Asymm. Damp. (η = 0.6) 0.08 ± 2.21 −0.10 ± 1.04 9.59 ± 10.72 13.88 ± 10.60 −6.74 ± 68.80 4.08 ± 7.73 1.23 ± 1.80 0.52 ± 3.29 5.79 ± 13.24 9.63 ± 6.94
Full-state −31.29 ± 27.97 −35.83 ± 13.96 −31.29 ± 27.97 −84.78 ± 31.71 −189.81 ± 68.31 −14.39 ± 9.38 −6.76 ± 11.52 −9.30 ± 23.17 −144.70 ± 104.64 −21.76 ± 17.71
LCTC-state −5.32 ± 52.34 5.92 ± 40.65 5.45 ± 40.79 −0.79 ± 68.59 9.00 ± 159.91 6.73 ± 22.88 3.04 ± 5.83 −2.72 ± 19.23 52.55 ± 81.70 7.02 ± 48.80
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Figure 3: Rolling mean and standard deviation on the aver-
age episodic reward during training for increasing values of
the damping factor, η, evaluated on HSBA.L.
behaviour and should be manipulated to match one’s risk profile.
This result relates strongly with the use of inventory penalising
terms in the value function in stochastic optimal control [7, 8] and
is a key contribution of this paper.
It was also observed that asymmetric dampening of the reward
function lead to improved stability during learning and better as-
ymptotic performance compared to the basic agent. Fig. 3 shows
how the mean and standard deviation of episodic reward varies
with increasing values of the damping factor, η, during training.
The change due to dampening is particularly apparent from the
standard deviation which is seen to diverge for η = 0.0 and de-
crease for η ≥ 0.1. This suggests that the inventory component
in Eq. 3 not only drives behaviour, but is also the main source of
instability, where increasing values of η appear to yield better and
more consistent performance. It is plausible that the large scale
and variation in rewards due to changes in the agent’s position
dominates the spread-capture term, and makes it very difficult to
learn an accurate estimate of the value function; one solution could
be to model the value function itself using a distribution [5].
State representation. Three state representations were considered:
an agent-state (as used by the basic agent), a full-state (agent and
market variables) and a linear combination of tile codings. The objec-
tive was to identify and resolve challenges associated with increased
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Figure 4: Rolling mean of the average episodic reward for
different agent variants during training on HSBA.L.
state complexity when including market parameters, which, as seen
by the performance of the full-state variant (Table 5), were found to
have a strongly negative impact on returns. Contrary to intuition,
we did not observe any considerable improvement in performance
with increased training, instead, the agent was regularly seen to
degrade and even diverge (both in episodic reward and TD-error).
Fig. 4 shows that the basic agent is more efficient at learning
than the full-state variant and tends to be more stable; this is to be
expected since the state-space is much smaller. To capitalise on this
stability and efficiency, whilst incorporating market information,
we turn to a linear combination of tile codings (LCTC). As shown in
Table 5, this variant considerably outperforms the full-state agent
and doesn’t appear to suffer from issues of divergence as seen in
with the full-state variant. Though in some cases it produced lower
PnL than the basic agent (as for GSK.L), this does not indicate a
problem with the approach, rather it is related to the choice of the
variables used to describe the state of the market; for example, we
find that it performs particularly well on SAN.MC. Indeed the choice
of which parameters to use for a given stock is a non-trivial task in
an of itself. The key result is that the LCTCmarries expressivity and
efficiency and helps to prevent divergence even when the market
variables have little informational content.
5.4 Consolidated agent.
Finally, a consolidation of the best variants on the basic agent is
considered. It uses the asymmetrically dampened reward function
with a LCTC state-space, trained using SARSA. In the majority of
cases it was found that this agent generated slightly lower returns
Table 6: Comparison of the out-of-sample normalised daily PnL (ND-PnL) and mean absolute positions (MAP) of the bench-
mark strategies against the final presented reinforcement learning agent.
Abernethy and Kale (MMMW) Fixed (θa,b = 5) Consolidated Agent
Benchmark Benchmark
ND-PnL [104] MAP [units] ND-PnL [104] MAP [units] ND-PnL [104] MAP [units]
CRDI.MI −1.44 ± 22.78 7814 ± 1012 −0.14 ± 1.63 205 ± 351 0.15 ± 0.59 1 ± 2
GASI.MI −1.86 ± 9.22 5743 ± 1333 0.01 ± 1.36 352 ± 523 0.00 ± 1.01 33 ± 65
GSK.L −3.36 ± 13.75 8181 ± 1041 0.95 ± 2.86 1342 ± 1210 7.32 ± 7.23 57 ± 105
HSBA.L 1.66 ± 22.48 7330 ± 1059 2.80 ± 10.30 2678 ± 1981 15.43 ± 13.01 104 ± 179
ING.AS −6.53 ± 41.85 7997 ± 1265 3.44 ± 23.24 2508 ± 1915 −3.21 ± 29.05 10 ± 20
LGEN.L −0.03 ± 11.42 5386 ± 1297 0.84 ± 2.45 986 ± 949 4.52 ± 8.29 229 ± 361
LSE.L −2.54 ± 4.50 4684 ± 1507 0.20 ± 0.63 382 ± 553 1.83 ± 3.32 72 ± 139
NOK1V.HE −0.97 ± 8.20 5991 ± 1304 −0.52 ± 4.16 274 ± 497 −5.28 ± 33.42 31 ± 62
SAN.MC −2.53 ± 26.51 8865 ± 671 1.52 ± 11.64 3021 ± 2194 5.67 ± 13.41 4 ± 9
VOD.L 1.80 ± 22.83 7283 ± 1579 1.26 ± 4.60 1906 ± 1553 5.02 ± 6.35 46 ± 87
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Figure 5: Out-of-sample equity curve and inventory process
for the basic and consolidated agents, evaluated on HSBA.L.
than the best individual variants, but had improved out-of-sample
stability; see Table 6. In addition, they tended to hold smaller in-
ventories, which may have been a contributing factor towards the
reduced uncertainty on PnL. Though the results vary slightly across
the basket of securities, the consolidated agent was found to pro-
duce superior risk-adjusted performance over the basic agent and
extended variants overall.
For example, Fig. 5 compares the equity and inventory processes
for the basic and consolidated agents’ out-of-sample tests. Both il-
lustrate a profound difference in behaviour between the two.Where
the former is highly volatile, the latter is stable. The basic agent
regularly holds a non-zero inventory, exposing itself to changes
in the security’s value for extended periods of time, leading to the
noise observed in the equity curve. For the consolidated agent, it
appears that the learnt policy targets a near-zero inventory, relying
less on speculative trading and thus yielding the consistency one
expects from a good market making strategy.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a reinforcement learning agent that produces
competitive out-of-sample performance across a basket of securities.
We first developed a highly realistic simulation of the problem
domain and showed how eligibility traces solve the problems raised
in past works. We then investigated different learning algorithms,
reward functions and state representations, and consolidated the
best techniques into a single agent which is shown to produce
superior risk-adjusted performance. The following represent key
areas for future research based on our results:
(1) Apply more advanced learning algorithms such as GreedyGQ,
Q(σ ) and true online variants [15, 30, 42], which provide guaran-
tees of convergencewith linear function approximation, options
learning [4] and direct policy search methods.
(2) Explore deep reinforcement learning, in particular using recur-
rent neural networks that should be well-suited to the sequen-
tial nature of the problem.
(3) Introduce parametrised action spaces [31] as an alternative to
discrete action sets.
(4) Extend to multiple order and variable order size action spaces.
(5) Investigate the impact of market frictions such as rebates, fees
and latency on the agent’s strategy.
(6) Use sequential Bayesian methods [13] for better order book
reconstruction and estimation of order queues.
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